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JOINDER IN DEMURRER
By EUGENE V. ROSTOW
IN the tradition of Doctor and Student - and Walton Hamilton is
one of those who helped school me in it -an argument never comes to
an end. The classical sequence is not Question and Answer, but Ques-
tion and further Question, until Truth is finally trussed up and labelled.
My learned and respected teacher has responded to my argument in the
approved scholastic manner, by saying that if its statements "were trans-
lated from the categorical to the inquisitorial," he would be tempted to
concur. In the workaday world, however, some questions must be
answered categorically, for the here and now, at least, if not for the
centuries. A statute expires. Should it be renewed? Professor Hamilton
says of the Coal Act, "Wait, to see how an interesting experiment works
out." Yet, for all his scholar's reservations, he gives a categorical bless-
ing to the official position of the Coal Division, that the Coal Act be
reenacted unchanged for at least two more years.
The issue between us appears to be joined in this pattern: The thesis
of my paper was that at the present time (the coal industry being pros-
perous), and for as long a period in the future as public and private
enterprise can maintain conditions of high employment in the society at
large, there is no call and no excuse for the minimum price program
of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. The Act does not serve the needs
of the industry, nor yet the public interest, in terms of any and all the
available theories about the recent history of bituminous coal, since it
does not provide for control of production, and, by raising prices, serves
to worsen the competitive position of coal in relation to other fuels. In
good times, the Act is an unnecessary subsidy to coal operators, and in
bad times it cannot prevent a disastrous fall in profits, production and
employment. Professor Hamilton's reply, as I understand it, is that in
good times or bad, the coal industry must have minimum prices, or it
will relapse into a socially dangerous condition which lie describes vari-
ously as "disorder" or "death."
The explanation he offers in support of his position runs in two inde-
pendent cycles. The first of his arguments has the form of a syllogism.
Professor Hamilton asserts that there must be "control" over industries
in situations where "the market" cannot "be trusted to work out the
details of order." "The" market - "whose positive agency of control is
competition" -can "properly" "perform its reputed office" only when
the industry in question satisfies a certain checklist of "conditions." These
conditions "must be met," or a "control" established. The conditions are
declared on page 596.
"A standard commodity, a free and open market, an increase in
unit expense with mounting volume, an obliging absence of the com-
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plexities brought by multiple products, a series of costs for skills
and materials which are not themselves reflections of price - these
are primary requisites. But others are almost as essential - an
industry open to newcomers; want of patents and other legal sanc-
tions with which to fence about closed domains; a freedom from
private government through price leadership or an intricate array of
trade practices; an institution of bankruptcy which promptly liquid-
ates the obsolescent venture."
The minor premise neatly follows. The coal industry does not satisfy
any such catechism of conditions; coal prices are set in thousands of
private bargains, without uniformity, and with reference only to the
particular circumstances of particular buyers and sellers. Q.E.D., says
Professor Hamilton, "a public control must replace the market as the
agency of industrial order."
As one freshly accused of faith and not works,1 may I mildly retort,
tu quoquef Whatever else Professor Hamilton's argument may be, it
is not taking "principle and example" from the same "plane," sternly
cabined by the facts about coal. Out of what hat did Professor Hamilton
pull his checklist of conditions, and why is it a checklist? Why does the
failure or not of the coal industry to satisfy such conditions prove any-
thing at all about the need for minimum price fixing? Agreed that coal
is sold very much as Professor Hamilton says it is. My argument is
explicitly based on a recognition of that fact. Why should the price
practices of the coal industry be changed, and why particularly should
they be changed in the way the Coal Division has changed them? Should
the mine realizations of coal operators be higher than they are now,
even though the coal industry does not fully match an arbitrary check-
-list of economists' conditions?
1. An accusation to which I enter as vigorous a denial as I may. My effort has been
to define every concept used in the analysis of the coal situation with concrete reference
to the circumstances of the industry, and then to use the term only in the defined sense.
To be sure, there are no "facts" apart from "theories" about them. But there are more
and less realistic theories about facts. It is hard to see how one can criticize the eco-
nomic policy of our coal arrangements without analyzing what the public is getting for
its money--i.e., the relation of coal costs and coal prices of various kinds. If some of
those conceptions are "empty boxes," they should be eliminated; but I don't think the
inquiry itself, into how much coal costs, can be avoided. The very general and unpar-
ticularized charges brought against the economic arguments of my article are reminis-
cent of broadsides in the famous battle of the "Institutionalists" against the "Neo-classi-
cists," in which Professor Hamilton has long been a conspicuous figure. Certainly
Mr. Hamilton's charges are not specifically directed at the issues raised in the article.
For example, I don't think I ever mentioned a "marginal mine" or "increasing cost"
(see page 600, note 7), nor, to my mind, is there any need of "reconciling" marginal
analysis and overhead costs; on the contrary, marginal analysis offers a powerful device
for explaining the roles of overhead costs in actual experience.
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I do not understand Professor Hamilton's faith in "order" and "sym-
metry" as goals for policy desirable in themselves. The words are
peppered throughout his article, but they seem to have a private meaning
which he nowhere fully explains, and which does not dearly appear from
the context of his argument. At one point, he does give the concept a
fairly plain meaning: "A potential output, impatient for release, exerts
its constant pressure towards industrial disorder." The sentence seems
to say that industrial "disorder" is connected with competition which
reduces prices. But why is it "disorderly" to have coal operators sell
coal at prices as low as they choose to go? In good times, like the present,
they make profits despite their price practices; in bad times, such prac-
tices tend to keep output and employment somewhat higher, relatively,
than is the case in industries where rigid prices put the whole burden
of depression on employment. And, in good times and bad alike, the
highly competitive price practices of the coal business give tie com-
munity assurance that its physical resources are being used more fully
than in industries whose organization is less competitive.
A floor under prices (all considerations of the regional allocation of
business apart) cannot prevent a fall in the demand for coal, and a fall
in profits, during periods of industrial inactivity. If the Hamiltonian
concept of "order" in the coal industry, represented by the Bituminous
Coal Act of 1937, does not mean the maintenance of profitable
conditions in the industry during bad times, what does it mean? A
general interchange among coal operators of knowledge about coal prices
and classifications, as represented in the mimeographed schedules of
minimum prices? Such knowledge, says Professor Hamilton, would be
a "boon to the coal business." It is difficult to see why or how. The
information services of trade associations, and the price filing devices
of the NRA codes, have now been generally recognized as techniques
used in many circumstances for keeping prices up and output down. Is
this what Professor Hamilton means by a "boon to the coal business"?
And why should such a "boon" be a boon to the public interest?
Another cycle of argument to explain why minimum prices are needed
in the coal industry, in good times and in bad, is contained in Part II
of Professor Hamilton's demurrer. This argument rests on a conception
as undefined as the principal term of the Checklist Syllogism in Part I.
Professor Hamilton starts Part II with the proposition that my analysis
of the problems of the industry is inadequate. "To me his items are
only manifestations of an industrial disorder which runs much deeper."
This deeper disorder is a tendency of operators to "overshoot" their
marks, whenever they become prey to a "recurrent excess of zeal." The
wartime expansion after 1917, says Professor Hamilton, is an instance,
but only an instance, of this tendency.2 It seems to me, to use Professor
2. I might call attention here to the fact that I do not hold the views attributed to
me at this point of Professor Hamilton's argument. On the contrary, I e.pressly repudiat-
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Hamilton's phrase, that such a view "rather trustfully" reads a pattern
of economic theory into the tangled events of bituminous coal history.
My argument was that unique circumstances of interregional competition
for coal business, and not a recurring impulse among "economic men"
to overshoot their marks, accounted for the unique coal troubles of the
twenties. Unlike the case of agriculture, the absolute demand for coal
did not fall off; the industry was demoralized by another factor, inter-
regional competition based on disparities in wages and freight rates.
I find Professor Hamilton's "recurrent excess of zeal" theory (which
should be compared with Pigou's related views) as remote from the facts
of the coal industry as he finds mine to be. Professor Hamilton reacts
sharply against my statement that, on the whole, production in old mines
is expanded, and new mines are opened, when operators anticipate that
their enlarged revenues will cover their enlarged operating costs; he much
prefers to say that coal operators "readily and hastily plunge into pro-
duction" when "the anticipation is no more than the thought of picking
up a little loose change; most of what comes in goes into wages." I'll
follow General Johnson's example and eat this bulky periodical if the
substance of Professor Hamilton's statement differs from that of mine.'
From this premise, Professor Hamilton's argument proceeds in a straight
march: mines "readily and hastily plunge into production," and our bank-
ed the Brookings' over-shooting-the-mark theory of events during the early twenties, as
a simplification of what actually happened.
Of course, as Professor Hamilton has somewhere remarked, a review is a matter of
chance, and one who writes should blame only himself if he has failed to communicate to
a careful reader. But I cannot resist denying some of the eloquent charges which Pro-
fessor Hamilton distills by generalizing from a single instance. I was writing about the
affairs of the coal industry; I do not believe, as charged on page 596, that a program of
expansion requires that "all" restraints, "all" trade barriers, "all" elements of structure
too rigid to bend be cleared away; my point was that there is no reason in view of the
organization of the coal business for adopting a policy other than anti-trust enforcement
with respect to commercial restrictions, as contrasted with those inherent in the wage
structure. Moreover, the dire charge on page 609 is a gross canard, anti hits a little
below the belt, in two particulars. Doesn't the accusation that I cherish "a deep-seated
distrust of a public agency as an instrument for the distribution of wealth" fall flat when
directed against an Article which advocates the direct expenditure of fuids in many enter-
prises-i.e., the direct distribution of wealth-by agencies of government? The issue is
not one of principle, but of particular cases. I am not convinced that minimum price
fixing in the coal industry serves a useful social purpose. I don't quite see how that posi-
tion implies that I harbor a Freudian malevolence against tax-gatherers and their work.
Furthermore, I did not choose the regulation of utilities as an example of the failure of
restriction schemes; whatever the shortcomings of state regulation in the utilities field,
such monopolies must be controlled. I directed attention rather to our negative expe-
rience with restriction schemes under NRA, and in raw materials and agriculture.
3. In the light of this part of Professor Hamilton's argument, what happens to his
rather dashing charge that unused coal reserves cannot be compared to the unused capacity
of existing mines? If new mines are opened as quickly as Professor Hamilton says,
surely my comparison applies a fortiori.
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ruptcy system does not drive them out of business soon enough.4 Oper-
ators can accommodate their costs to market conditions, and keep on pro-
ducing, so long as they can pay the wages and freight rates they have
to pay- and here some flexibility may be achieved, in whittling costs
to suit prices. I thought I said exactly that; in any event, I quite agree
that production is carried forward in times of falling prices beyond the
point at which full overhead costs are earned. From this it apparently
follows that "recurring excesses of zeal" among operators will lead "not
merely" to "overcapacity" but to disorder.
If this is really Professor Hamilton's "deeper" reason why the C. al
Act should be renewed, I must reiterate my dissent both from the analysis
and from the conclusion. In the first place, the Act does notling to
prevent these Hamiltonian "excesses of zeal" - on the contrary, it en-
courages them, by raising prices, and setting up no barrier to the expan-
sion of production in existing mines, or to the entry of new mines into
production. Here one may quote Professor Hamilton against himself;
he once said, of another proposal for "ordering" the coal business: "These
proposals show that the failure of the Commission is a failure of analysis.
If the coal industry is to be made orderly, there must be a control of
capacity.",' But there are more general reasons for opposing Professor
Hamilton's tbo-facile "zeal" theory. Professor Hamilton's argument ap-
plies, expressly, to any industry in wlich there are many independent
producers, each producing a small share of the total production. Is he
then saying that in our society we cannot afford to have industry com-
petitively organized? Isn't Professor Hamilton's theory a speculative
projection into the future of an abstract notion of business men's behavior
and an abstract and mechanical theory of trade fluctuations?o Professor
Hamilton's use of such blunted analytical tools comes, I suggest, from
his failure to enrich his price studies by reviewing them in the perspective
of the literature about trade fluctuations. Is there any real reason, in the
light of the past and present of the coal business, now to expect the num-
ber of mines to become "excessive"? Excessive in relation to what? If
the demand for coal is maintained by the maintenance of a high rate of
industrial activity, and if wage rates are firmly stabilized, why should
the number of mines become excessive? Professor Hamilton's prophecy
does not fit the pattern of events in the past, and there is little concrete
4. Professor Hamilton sounds this note at three points at least in his article. Here,
I think, our disagreement is profound. The reproach to the bankruptcy system, to my
mind, is that it intervenes too soon (i.e., when an enterprise fails to pay interest on its
bonds or their equivalent), not, as Professor Hamilton contends, too late in the history
of a particular enterprise. Why abandon equipment which can be used to produce coal
at prices which more than cover operating costs, i.e., wages, power, physical mainte-
nance, etc. ?
5. HA mTIoN & WRIGHT, A WAY oF ORDER FOR BiTumzous CotA. (1928) 95.
6. See HABEmRER, PRosPERITY AND DPamssIox (1939 ed.) 128, 134-136, and c. 6.
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reason for supposing that it will be realized in the future. During the
twenties, coal mining capacity became excessive in the wake of the inter-
regional competition of that time; it became generally redundant, on a
large scale, during the thirties, after the depression, occasioned by other
factors, had caused an absolute decline in demand for coal, and not before.
At less abstract and hypothetical levels of argument, Professor Hamil-
ton relies mainly on consideration for the welfare of mine labor as a
reason for seeking renewal of the Act. The unionization of the fields, he
says, is not enough to protect labor, at least in bad times; in this view
the officials of the United Mine Workers concur. The opinion of the
union on the desirability of minimum prices is somewhat weakened by
the record of that agency in sticking to its doctrinaire theory of labor
economics without regard to the course of events. The union believes in
ever higher money wages, and in coal prices high enough to pay them.
That position was an important factor in the interregional competition
of the twenties; it is the basic plank of the anthracite cartel now in opera-
tion. High money wages have encouraged the mechanization of mines,
and the replacement of miners by machinery. The seven-hour day now
prevails, and the union wants to make it a six-hour day. Professor
Hamilton once said of this proposal: "The workers must choose between
rather better livings for a smaller number of workers, and "the retention
of more workers on lower wages." ' One should approach the demand
of the union for minimum prices, as the essential condition for the pre-
servation of its wage standards, in the light of Professor Hamilton's
warning. It may be that collective bargaining and a high level of in-
dustrial activity cannot alone protect labor against exploitation; at present,
Professor Hamilton concedes, the profitable condition of the industry
gives hope to labor, "but the enlarged ability to pay derives in no small
part from the price schedules recently promulgated by the Bituminous
Coal Division."'8 If investigation should bear out this conclusion, the
obvious remedy for the protection of wage standards is direct regulation
of wages. Such regulation would be easier to enforce and cheaper to
administer than the regulation of prices. Both parties to a violation of
minimum price schedules are anxious to conceal the violation; but a
worker victimized, if backed by a strong union and a fair enforcement
tribunal, has no incentive to submit. The enforcement of minimal wage
scales, unlike the enforcement of minimum prices, thus might easily
survive a depression. Furthermore, the setting of minimum wages, either
7. HAMILTON & WRIGHT, A WAY OF ORDER FOR BITUMINOUS COAL (1928) 105.
8. This proposition is open to some doubt. If production during 1940 is broken
down by quarters, it appears, paradoxically enough, that the first three quarters were
25% ahead of the corresponding period of 1939, but that in the fourth quarter, during
which minimum prices were established, production was 6% below that of the fourth
quarter of 1939, despite the accelerating pace of the rearmament boom.
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under state statutes or under the Fair Labor Standards Act, has not
involved a rigmarole of investigation as elaborate, or as irrelevant, as
that under the Bituminous Coal Act.
Professor Hamilton goes further, into a risky argument of analogy.
"The pricing process is of a character with those of wage-making and
rate-fixing between which it is pent in. In fact all three are pricing
processes. If a general oversight is necessary in respect to two of these
three aspects which are interlocked, its necessity seems apparent for the
third." Not at all. Wage fixing is undertaken for the social protection of
the worker, and that policy should go forward, as Professor Hamilton
indicates, to wipe out other means of exploiting labor- company stores,
wages in scrip, and so on. Freight rates are the charges of monopoly,
and control over such prices is needed for reasons which do not obtain
in the highly competitive economy of coal prices.
In the end, Professor Hamilton's plea for the Act, despite its qualities
as a general denial, turns out really to be a demurrer, or at least a defense
of confession and avoidance. Higher prices are to be charged for coal,
he admits, and the coal industry is to be given a larger share of the
national income, although higher prices are a subsidy which does not
promise to prevent the recurrence of disaster in the coal industry, either
in good times or in bad. But this grant to the coal operators is justified
for two reasons. In the first place, he says, it is not a charge against
consumers, since only 20 per cent of all coal "finds its way into the house-
hold bin." Among other coal consumers, "the cost of power is a micro-
scopic item in the retail price of the good." This is a great deal like the
defense of the bastard child in one of Captain Marryat's novels: "But,
Sir, it's such a little one." It is under any circumstances a curious argu-
ment. If the average of mine realizations for coal is increased 10 or 11
cents, as the Coal Division hopes,9 between $45,000,000 and $50,000,000
will have been withdrawn from the pockets of the rest of the community
for the benefit of coal people. There has been no compensating increase
in the total amount of money, and the transaction is simply a change in
the way an existing fund is allocated. To say that the subsidy hurts
no one because it may not fall directly on the householding consumer
defies all our experience with indirect taxation, as well as the rules of
arithmetic. If the arrangement be judged on its merits, as a subsidy, its
claim for justification appears doubtful. Is there a social reason to want
the coal companies rather than the railroads to present good balance
sheets? Do we want investors attracted to coal mining, and new equip-
ment put into mines, rather than into railroads, utilities or manufacturing
industry generally? The fact that the subsidy is made so undiscriminat-
ingly, and at the expense of groups who may deserve as well of the
9. 3 A'N. REP. UNDER THE BrruzNous CoAL Acr OF 1937 (1940) 4-5.
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Treasury as coal operators, subtracts from its possible merit as a subsidy
to redress the bargaining position of the coal men.
But Professor Hamilton advances -another count in his plea. Higher
prices and the powers of the Division will work in the public interest,
he says, in several noteworthy ways: the Division may control interfuel
competition, it may conduct research and fight the good fight for con-
servation. But neither the Act nor its administration contribute anything
substantial in such worthy directions. Price fixing is not a necessary con-
dition to the carrying on of research in the uses of coal; nor does it
contribute at all to the public interest in conservation.. A higher return
permits, but surely does not "promise," a "more efficient exploitation"
of coal reserves. The only way to get conservation is to work for con-
servation, by detailed mining regulations and inspections. Higher profits
are no shortcut to conservation. As for interfuel competition, Secretary
Ickes has on several occasions pointed out that the system of price control
represented in the Coal Act will have to include both oil and gas before
the Division can hope to control the competition among substitute fuels.
All in all, I don't find Professor Hamilton's article a persuasive answer
to the questions which seem to me immanent in our coal experience.
Perhaps the most striking feature of his argument is the absence from
it of a detailed defense of the particular statute about to expire, as com-
pared with other possible remedies for the ills 'of the industry. He does
not fully discuss the cost provisions of the-Act, the absence of controls
over production, the possibilities of using the English or German models
for control, or the desirability of the Allen Bill, the industry's proposal
for its own salvation through private monopoly. Does Professor Hamilton
think it wise, expedient or necessary to amend the Coal Act of 1937?
Would he have a usable maximum price provision written into the
statute? Would he change the statutory language about the coordination
of coal prices? In answer to these questions, he tells us simply to renew
the Act. It is not enough of an-answer; in view of the affirmative dis-
advantages of the Act, and the cumulative policy towards the control
of business routine which it represents. "Our present relapse into the
methods of medieval monopoly is not progress but reaction." 10
10. ROBBIS, THE EcoNoMIc BASIS OF CLAss CONFLICT (1939) 44.
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